




The Decision to Block
Iranian Assets-Reexamined*
The full story behind the decision to impose a freeze on Iranian assets
may never be known. But a report issued in July 1981 by the staff of the
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs provides a great
deal more information about it than was previously available to the public.
In so doing, it helps set to rest some of the more fanciful of the accounts
that appeared in the press, as well as to provide as reasoned a basis for
appraising the decision as is likely to emerge. For these reasons, and
because the Iranian revolution and the freeze engendered such an unprece-
dented spate of litigation, this installment of Trends reexamines the deci-
sion to freeze Iranian assets in light of the findings of the staff report.
Background
The President imposed the freeze on Iranian assets on November 14,
1979. Ten days earlier, the United States Embassy in Tehran and the
United States Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz had been seized by a group
of Iranian students who took hostage all persons present, diplomatic and
non-diplomatic.
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It was not the first time the Embassy had been attacked. On February 14,
three days after the resignation of the Shah's caretaker government headed
by Shahpur Bakhtiar, a mob led by Marxist guerillas had overrun the
Embassy, taking nearly a hundred Americans hostage in an episode similar
to that which was to take place nine months later. The February siege had
ended when the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister personally led a group of
revolutionary guards to obtain the release of the captured embassy person-
nel.I Later, only the week before the November 4 takeover, the provisional
government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan had turned marching dem-
onstrators away from the streets outside the American Embassy.2 Appar-
ently, the success of the government authorities in thwarting these assaults
gave the United States government cause to hope that the November 4
seizure, too, would be shortlived. In fact, for a brief time it appeared the
Iranian government would again assert its authority and rescue the embassy
arid tht hostages.3
For at least two reasons the Iranian government could not do so, how-
ever. The first is that the students who had seized the embassy, planning to
stage a sit-in for three to five days, instantly became folk heroes in Iran and
thereby a political force more powerful than the government could control.
Indeed, the Ayatollah Khomeini himself endorsed the taking of the
embassy and the hostages. The second reason is that on November 6, in a
not unrelated development, Prime Minister Bazargan's provisional govern-
ment resigned, yielding such power as it still retained to the dominant
Islamic clergymen of the secret Revolutionary Council, a group for whom a
resolution of the hostage crisis was not to become a matter of urgency for
many months. In the meanwhile, the students, who became known as Stu-
dents Following the Imam's Line, managed to precipitate a major interna-
tional crisis that was as much public theater as it was an intergovernmental
dispute.
The crisis was felt first in Washington. There, the inability of the United
States government to obtain the release of its diplomats and other United
States nationals seemed to symbolize a national impotence which had
begun with a failure of will in Vietnam. The American people are not
noted for their patience in the face of what they perceive to be a deliberate
provocation, a challenge to American national manhood. Correctly or not,
'See REPORT STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
97TH CONG., IST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT 3 (Comm. Print 97-5, July 1981) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE STAFF REPORT].
This document was prepared in response to a request by Committee Chairman Fernard J. St.
Germain (D.-R.I.) for a detailed analysis of the financial aspects of the Iranian hostage settle-
ment agreement.2See Kifner, How a Sit-In Turned into a Siege, in America in Captivity. Points OfDecision in
the Hostage Crisis, An Inquiry by The New York Times, New York Times Magazine (Special
Issue, 1981), at 54, 56.
3The Iranian Foreign Minister had indicated that such a move was underway, in a conversa-
tion with the American charge d'affaires shortly after the November 4 takeover. HOUSE STAFF
REPORT at 9.
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such challenges were considered by many Americans to have become more
frequent in the 1970s and American responses to them were thought to have
become intolerably passive during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Carter
had remained an enigma to the public: cool, aloof, thoughtful but indeci-
sive, a decent man whose decency did not often seem to result in tangible
achievements in international relations. More importantly, perhaps, he had
never managed to secure the political blessings that come from a supportive
press and a party majority in Congress. In his years as President, Carter
faced a capital press corps and a Congress united in their separate determi-
nation to reassert their respective prerogatives.
The seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran, and even more the tak-
ing and televised display of the American hostages, presented President
Carter with a dramatic opportunity to show the American public just how
decisive and forceful a chief executive he could be. The Mayaguez incident
had provided President Ford with a similar opportunity, in May 1 75, just
two weeks after the final, ignominious departure of the United States mili-
tary forces from Vietnam. President Ford's waning popularity had
increased dramatically with the release of the vessel and its crew, even
though the raids he ordered seem to have had little to do with their release
and, in fact, appear to have been expensive in operation, with 41 Americans
lost and 50 more wounded. In a culture which counts the quick-acting sher-
iff as a superhero and instinctively distrusts anyone who counsels caution,
the hostage crisis presented a ready-made opportunity for an American
president to give his political popularity a boost. The temptation to do
something quickly, dramatically, decisively, must have been seductive.
President Carter moved cautiously, however, appealing to Americans to
exercise restraint toward Iran and toward Iranian citizens in the United
States and to do nothing that might endanger the lives of the hostages. 4 A
decision was reached to make every effort to gain the release of the hostages
through diplomatic means to avoid putting the hostages' lives in danger.5
The President decided, first, to send two special envoys to Iran to meet per-
sonally with the Ayatollah Khomeini to secure his help in obtaining the
release of the hostages. One of the envoys, former Attorney General Ram-
sey Clark, had had a long and close association with many of the new Ira-
nian leaders and had met with the Ayatollah in Paris earlier in the year.
The other, William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Committee on Intel-
ligence, had served in Iran as a Foreign Service Officer in the 1950s and
1960s and he, too, knew the Iranian revolutionary leaders. The Iranian
government initially indicated that it would receive the Clark-Miller mis-
sion, but as Mr. Clark was about to board a commercial flight from Istanbul
to Tehran on November 7, he was informed that the Iranian government
41d. at 9-10.
'Id. at 10. See also Smith, Putting the Hostages' Lives First, in America in Captivity: Points
of Decision in the Hostage Crisis, An Inquiry by the New York Times, New York Times Maga-
zine (Special Issue, 1981), at 77 ff. (hereinafter cited as Hostages First).
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had decided that he should not come to Iran and that no officials in Iran
should have discussions with American representatives. 6
Other than to continue to pursue diplomatic efforts, President Carter had
few realistic options available to him that were likely to secure the release
of the hostages while at the same time protecting long-term United States
interests in the Persian Gulf. Military options were considered feasible, but
were rejected nonetheless as unlikely to free the hostages.7 Economic sanc-
tions which, by statute, necessitated a declaration of war against Iran were
rejected on that account alone.8
The first public announcement by the Carter Administration of action
linked to the American hostages came on November 10, six days after they
had been taken captive. The President ordered Attorney General Benjamin
Civiletti to identify any Iranian students in the United States who were not
complying with the terms of their reentry visas and to initiate deportation
proceedings against any Iranian students who had violated immigration
laws and regulations. In the weeks to follow, this action was to prove not
only unpopular but ineffective as well, the latter in part because of some
'Contacts and talks undertaken by the Clark-Miller mission in Turkey, in combination with
others in Washington and elsewhere, led to the release of thirteen hostages on November 19
and 20.
7Terrence Smith, who was the New York Times' chief White House correspondent during
the hostage crisis, reports that when the President met with his advisers at Camp David on
November 20, sixteen days after the seizure of the hostages, the military options presented by
the Pentagon included a naval blockade of Iran, mining of Iranian harbors, seizure of the oil
depots on Kharg Island and a punitive bombing of the huge refinery at Abadan. All were
deemed militarily feasible, but none was thought likely to lead to the safe release of the hos-
tages. Hostages First, supra note 5, at 83. The House Staff Report observed that "during the
immediate post-hostage period, military options with economic significance such as blockade
of Iranian ports were under consideration. Nonmilitary political and economic alternatives,
which were always considered the preferable course, were the subject of detailed option papers
during the November 10 to November 14 period." HousE STAFF REPORT at 10.
Vd. One possibility seriously considered in the early days of the hostage crisis was a com-
plete export embargo. The Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401 et seq. (1969),
as amended, does not authorize a total embargo. The Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.
App. §§ I et seq. (1970) does, but the imposition of economic sanctions under the Trading with
the Enemy Act would have required a declaration of war against Iran and was, apparently for
this reason, not seriously debated or considered. See HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 10. A complete
embargo was also deemed permissible under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, which does not require a declaration of war. But complete or even partial export
embargos inevitably implicate third countries. The House Staff Report concluded:
Export embargo options also required that before deciding on the scope of any foreign
policy controls, it was necessary to consider the extent to which United States goods and
technology used by foreign companies and United States foreign subsidiaries should be sub-
ject to controls. This was an important point bearing on United States relations with third
countries. It was also necessary to consider whether the controls would apply to all items
produced by foreign subsidiaries of United States firms even if those items did not contain
United States origin goods or technology. Any form of export control or embargo had a
myriad of commercial and economic ramifications which were often broader than the pur-
pose of the controls. Any controls imposed would have to allow sufficient flexibility to per-
mit the Commerce Department to alleviate any unintended commercial or economic
consequences without appearing to lessen United States resolve.
HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 11-12.
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doubts about the constitutionality of a classification of aliens motivated
solely by a foreign policy dispute with the government of the aliens'
homeland. 9
The Administration's first direct economic sanction against Iran came
two days later, on November 12, in the form of an immediate discontinu-
ance of United States oil imports from Iran. In a sense, this was the first
"freeze," but unlike the monetary freeze which followed two days later, the
principal objective of cutting off oil imports from Iran was essentially
defensive-that is, to deprive Iran itself of the capacity to threaten a cut-off
of its oil to the United States. ' 0
The possibility of imposing a freeze on Iranian assets had been consid-
ered as early as February 1979, some nine months before the seizure of the
embassy and the taking of hostages."I The political situation in Iran had
been in turmoil since late in December 1978.12 The daily strikes and dem-
onstrations against the Shah had spread to the oil fields and had begun to
threaten to interrupt the flow of oil exports badly needed in the United
States, Western Europe and Japan. The position of the Shah himself dete-
riorated quickly, culminating in his departure from Iran on January 16 "for
an extended vacation" from which he never returned. Wildly cheering
crowds, upward of a million people, had taken to the streets to greet the
Ayatollah Khomeini upon his return to Iran on February 1st after fifteen
years of exile. Ten days later the Bakhtiar regime had resigned and three
days after that had come the abortive seizure of the American Embassy.13
At the State Department an inter-agency task force had been established
in December to prepare specific plans to draw down the official presence of
United States nationals in Iran-no easy task considering the number of
Americans then in Iran (as many as 40,000 to 50,000, about 1,500 of whom
were there in an official capacity), the $12 billion in United States military
sales contracts with the Iranian government, and the existence in Iran of
two sensitive intelligence monitoring stations. 14 At the National Security
Council, a Special Coordinating Committee chaired by Zbigniew Brzezin-
ski, the President's National Security Adviser, was meeting on a daily basis
to review the evacuation plans and discuss developments in Iran.'1
The economic situation in Iran was also chaotic, again because of the
disruptions in work and the virtual collapse of civil authority, but also
'See Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980). See also Note, Aliens-Constitutionality of Discrimination
Based on National Origin-Narenji v. Civiletti, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467 (1980).
"See HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 10.
"Id. at 5.
"Id. at 1. A series of increasingly violent incidents and demonstrations that occurred in
Tehran and other major Iranian cities, including some incidents both in the vicinity of the
United States embassy and involving United States commercial offices, led to the establish-





because the Ayatollah Khomeini periodically threatened to repudiate con-
tracts with American firms negotiated by the Shah. 16 The threats were gen-
eral, not specific, but given the Ayatollah's exalted stature in revolutionary
Iran, they were bound to be disruptive.
The operations of Iran's central bank, Bank Markazi, had been inter-
rupted by the strikes, the unfamiliarity of new bank and other government
officials with standard banking and commercial procedures, and the ongo-
ing uncertainty over who was authorized by whom to approve what. But in
an effort to maintain Iran's credit rating, Bank Markazi was apparently
meticulous in servicing foreign loans on schedule and in keeping its credi-
tors informed when for any reason payments were as late as two or three
days.' 7
Nevertheless, the possibility of a repudiation by Iran of American con-
tracts, including bank loan agreements, and a withdrawal of Iranian funds
from American banks was taken seriously enough in both the State and
Treasury Departments to warrant more than routine consideration of
imposing a freeze on Iranian assets.1 8 A February 12, 1979, legal memo-
randum requested by the Treasury's Office of General Counsel noted that a
freeze could be imposed under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA),19 if the President declared a national emergency-a
move, the memorandum said, that was no more extraordinary than what
would have been needed to trigger a freeze under the Trading with the
Enemy Act before that Act was revised. 20 From a legal standpoint, it
added, quite apart from political considerations, the situation then prevail-
ing in Iran justified the use of IEEPA. Not only had 'Congress intended
IEEPA to cover this type of situation, the memorandum said, but case law,
too, would support the President's decision to declare a national emergency
as a political judgment which courts traditionally are reluctant to ques-
tion.2' Meanwhile, its author wrote, Treasury Department lawyers would
continue to look into whether banks and other claimants had private, self-
help remedies available to them. 22 Attached to the memorandum were pro-
"
6 These threatened contracts eventually led to attempts by unpaid suppliers to obtain pre-
judgment attachments on Iranian assets within the United States.
"
7 HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 3. In March and April 1979 Iran publicly reassured foreign
leaders that it intended to continue paying its debts. American banks polled by Chase Man-
hattan Bank (acting as agent for three syndicated loans to Iran) refused to consider calling any
of the Iranian loans under provisions in the loan agreements that were to become controversial
when a Chase-led syndicate declared one of the loans in default following the President's
imposition of the freeze. Id.
"HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 4-5.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
2
°The provisions and operating history of these statutes are discussed in Gordon, The Block-
ing of Iranian Assets, 15 INT'L LAW. 296 (1980).
2 HousE STAFF REPORT at 5.
22HousE STAFF REPORT at 5. Another staff legal memorandum, also requested by the
Treasury's Office of General Counsel and dated February 14, two days after the one herein
referred to, contained a detailed discussion of the remedies available to private United States
Iranian Assets Case 167
posed regulations to implement a freeze if one were ordered. 23
At about the same time, the Treasury Department's International Affairs
Office began to gather current information on Iranian assets and liabilities
within the United States and U.S. portfolio capital movements involving
Iran.24 Reports from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the New
York Fed) to the Treasury Department showed that Iran had made sub-
stantial shifts of funds on February 2 and 8.25 Though large enough to
warrant concern, these movements were apparently requested by Iran for
routine payment and liquidity purposes and were not meant as a signal of
economic warfare against the United States. 26 Indeed, the fact that Iran
continued to channel its petrodollars through, and maintain acounts in,
American banks may be seen, in retrospect at least, to be an indication that
practical considerations dictated Iran's continuing dependence on the facili-
ties provided by American commercial banks.27
Be that as it may, high officials in the International Affairs Office, appar-
ently in response to a request from the interagency task force, also consid-
ered the economic ramifications of a withdrawal of Iranian funds from
United States banks or the conversion of Iranian-held dollars into other
currencies. 28 The conclusions reached by Treasury Department officials by
mid-February 1979 were that American banks (including their foreign
branches) collectively probably held Iranian deposits in excess of their
credit exposure to Iran; the United States government also held Iranian
funds in amounts which substantially exceeded current government claims




"Id. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the "New York Fed," as it is known in
banking circles) acts as an agent of the Treasury in gold and foreign exchange transactions and
is an agent of the Federal Reserve banks for foreign accounts. See THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM 276 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 5th ed., 1963). The agency
relationship between the New York Fed and the Treasury is authorized by statute, 12 U.S.C.
§ 391 (1968) and implemented by Treasury regulation and contract. See, for example, the
Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 535.213 (1981), issued pursuant to Exec. Order
No. 12,170 and 12,205 under the authority of 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1977), that is, IEEPA.21HouSE STAFF REPORT at 5. The movement of Iranian funds among American banks may
be coincidental to, but then again may be explained by, Iran's deliberate shift of the funds of
the National Iranian Oil Company [NIOCI from Chase Manhattan Bank to other American
banks. The NIOC account, representing oil payment dollars, was held at Chase Manhattan
Bank while the Shah ruled Iran. In post-Shah Iran, however, NIOC's Chase account was
wound down, deliberately, in retaliation for the close association the Bank and its chairman,
David Rockefeller, had had with the Shah. Apparently, most of these funds (the weekly flow
of NIOC dollars through Chase had been as much as $300-$500 million during 1979) were
transferred to foreign branches of'other U.S. banks, especially Bank of America, which had
aggressively courted the NIOC funds. See HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 8, 38 and 51-56.
7Id. at 8.
281d. at 5. A legal memorandum prepared by the International Affairs Office concluded that
two alternatives would be available if this happened: ie., a freeze of Iranian assets which also
blocked transactions involving such assets, and suits by the United States government and
private parties in American courts within the limitations of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976. Id. at 6.
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on Iran; all Iranian assets in the United States could be frozen and all
financial transactions blocked on the basis of a presidential declaration
under IEEPA29 of a national emergency related to Iran; and assets of pri-
vate Iranian residents in the United States might be subject to attachment,
but those of Iranian government agencies probably could not be reached by
attachment. 30 Thus, some nine months before the November hostage crisis,
the Treasury Department as a matter of prudent contingency planning had
laid the basis for a freeze of Iranian assets very much like that which the
President eventually imposed.31
That its contingency plans contemplated the imposition of a freeze and
regarded as manageable the difficulties likely to be encountered in putting
one into effect does not compel the conclusion that the Treasury intended
all along to freeze Iranian assets and that it merely used subsequent events
to justify such a plan. One does not know how many other contingencies
were anticipated with plans that were never used. And one does not know
how seriously the possibility of invoking a freeze was taken at high-ranking
policy levels within the Carter Administration or to what extent actual
events reflected the contingencies anticipated. The drafting of foreign
assets control regulations, though complex and technically demanding
when done without the guidance of precedent, is one of those exercises in
economic control in which the Treasury Department has had extensive
experience. Since the end of World War II, the United States has frozen
the assets within or coming within its jurisdiction of the People's Republic
of China,32 North Korea, 33 Cambodia,34 Vietnam, 35 and Cuba36 -all pur-
suant to regulations prepared by the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control. The statutory basis of such regulations had changed, substantially
so, with the passage of IEEPA and amendments to the Trading with the
Enemy Act. 37 But these changes did not render obsolete existing or previ-
ously administered regulations or the expertise gained in administering
them. Thus, the drafting of Iranian assets control regulations does not nec-
essarily indicate that a high priority was being given at that time to the
possibility of blocking those assets.
9See note 25, supra.
'°HousE STAFF REPORT at 6.
31d. At the State Department, the interagency task force was also considering the possibil-
ity of some form of economic sanctions against Iran, but in more general terms than was the
case at the Treasury. The Treasury Department was the lead agency in financial aspects of a
freeze, Id. at 7.
"China was removed from most foreign assets control regulations in 1980. See 15 Fed. Reg.
9,040 (1950), as amended at 18 Fed. Reg. 2,079 (1953) and at 45 Fed. Reg. 7,224 (1980).
"North Korea, ie., Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel of north latitude, has been
subjected to an assets freeze since December 17, 1950. See 31 C.F.R. § 500.201.34Cambodia has been subjected to an assets freeze since April 17, 1975. Id.
"North Vietnam has been subjected to an assets freeze since May 5, 1964, and South Viet-
nam since April 30, 1975. Id.
16Cuba has been subjected to an assets freeze since July 8, 1963. See 32 C.F.R. § 515.201.
3"See Gordon, supra note 20,passim.
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It is by no means certain that high-ranking Treasury Department officials
even favored a policy of freezing Iranian assets in the event Iran repudiated
contracts with American firms and converted dollars into other currencies.
In fact, the public record does not reveal that the contingency plans being
developed within the General Counsel's Office were requested by, or even
sent to, the Secretary of the Treasury or the Assistant Secretary for Interna-
tional Affairs-the two individuals who more than any others would have
been responsible for making a decision to recommend the imposition of a
freeze to the President. It is known that an internal Treasury memorandum
(author(s) unidentified) in January 1979 concluded that
There are two reasons why U.S. banks would not be particularly vulnerable to
a sudden withdrawal of Iranian deposits. First, Iranian deposits with U.S. banks
have varying maturities which stretch out over months if not years. Second,
banks have immediate access to several alternative sources of funds which have
evolved to support an essential function of banking-maturity transformation. 38
This accords with the Treasury's longstanding public posture that American
banks could cope with even massive foreign withdrawals of deposits. In
testimony in April 1977 before a subcommittee of the House Banking Com-
mittee, C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Interna-
tional Affairs, had said of the possibility of withdrawal of substantial
amounts of petrodollar deposits in United States banks by members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC):
Well, if they took them out of American banks, where would they put them?
Only in the Eurocurrency [market]. Then, because of the way interest rates
would react to that and because of the workings of the interbank markets, the
money would be funneled back largely to the banks from which they came in the
first place. That is not just theory; that is fact. 39
Financial Consideration
To appreciate the context in which these remarks and similar ones ema-
nating from Treasury Department and other United States monetary
authorities in the late 1970s were made is to recall the dramatic changes
overtaking commercial banking at the time. These changes affected both
the profitability of banking operations and the difficulty of managing the
funds banks handle. Commercial banks traditionally earn profits by buy-
ing deposits for less than they charge for the use of the funds. However, in
the 1970s both the ways in which commercial banks raised funds and the
ways in which they placed funds had changed. On the deposit side, in the
1950s and 1960s, United States commercial banks had been able to tap
comparatively stable sources of funding, a large proportion of which took
the form of interest-free checking accounts ("demand deposits") in amounts
that remained relatively constant or that varied in predictable patterns. By
"




the late 1970s, this proportion had declined sharply as a result of keen com-
petition for savings, especially in this regard short-term savings .of the type
characterized by demand deposits. The federal government was a source of
competition, as the Treasury borrowed record amounts of short-term funds
to bridge the time gap between federal tax receipts and expenditures. The
corporate sphere was another, as the issuance of short-term commercial
paper became an increasingly popular medium of corporate financing,
especially with the advent of money market mutual funds. And the bank-
ing industry itself became more competitive, as savings and commercial
banks became more innovative in an effort to attract deposits. Thus,
whereas in 1952 demand deposits had accounted for more than 70 percent
of commercial bank liabilities (they are liabilities because they represent
claims on bank assets by depositors), by 1977 they accounted for less than
30 percent. 40 This meant a higher overall cost of funds to the banks, a
factor which was magnified as large commercial banks began to rely more
heavily on relatively high-cost overnight borrowing (typically by selling
their holdings of United States government securities under arrangements
to repurchase them a day or a few days later at a slightly higher price-the
difference between the sale and purchase prices, in effect, constituting the
interest on what is essentially a very short-term loan).
Bank lending patterns had changed, too, partly because commercial bor-
rowers had become more aggressive in seeking capital, partly because capi-
tal was available, on attractive terms, from buyers of corporate commercial
paper 4 '--especially (by late in the decade) the money market funds42 -and
from foreign banks.43 In short, liquidity led increasingly to a "buyers'," i.e.,
borrowers', market. This pattern was reflected in a sharp increase in the
average length of maturity of bank loans. In the 1960s, bank loans to busi-
nesses carrying maturities of more than a year were rare. By the late 1970s,
loans of up to ten years had become commonplace.44 A similar trend was
evident in personal loans.45
Thus, in addition to being caught in a squeeze on their profits from
United States banking operations, the banks found themselves confronting
anew a classic problem of banking: that is, "liability management" or
"maturity transformation," as it is variably described, or what to do when
you are borrowing short-term (and from unstable sources, at that) and lend-
ing long. If, for any reason, the banks were unable to continue to attract
'See Bennett, For the Banks, It's Change or Perish, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1981, Sec. 3, at 24.4
'The commercial paper market doubled between 1977 and 1980, growing to more than $140
billion. Id.
42The net assets of money market funds held fairly constant from 1975 to 1978, burgeoned
from less than $10 billion in 1978 to around $70 billion by 1980, then reached a total of about
$140 billion by mid-1981. Id.43Foreign banks accounted for less than 1% of the loans extended to the nonfinancial sector
in 1967. By 1980 that proportion had grown to 14%. Id.
"Id.
451d.
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short-term funds or were met with a rapid withdrawal of large amounts of
such funds, and at the same time were unable to sell off their long-term
loans and other investments without taking huge losses, their liquidity
would be threatened and the possibility of bankruptcies would arise. Even
the prospect or rumor of a liquidity crunch at a major bank could be
enough to cause panic among its depositors and send shock waves through-
out capital markets generally. If the entire banking system were seen to be
similarly distressed, a self-reinforcing run on the dollar and sell-off of dol-
lar-denominated securities could be expected to follow.
In contrast to their domestic operations, the overseas activities of United
States commercial banks flourished both in volume and profitability in the
1970s, but again with serious implications for the management by such
multinational banks of their liabilities. United States banks had been
attracted overseas in the middle 1960s by the Eurodollar market. A word
or two needs to be said at this point about the misleading word "Eurodol-
lar" and what it describes. The most uncluttered (and until December 3,
1981, accurate) explanation of the term remains that which Henry Harfield,
of the New York law firm of Shearman & Sterling, provided in an article in
the Banking Law Journal in 1972:
A "Eurodollar" is a claim expressed and payable in United States dollars, that
is properly made against any bank at one or more of its offices or establishments
outside the United States. The "Euro" part of the word is merely a misleading
convenience. A Eurodollar is a claim, such as I have defined, that may be pay-
able anywhere in the world outside of the United States. In a particular instance,
it might be an Afro-dollar or an Asia-dollar, or a Latino-dollar, or even a Canuck
buck; we sweep them all into the categorical term "Eurodollar." 46
Beginning in 1973, the Eurodollar market took on a new function: that
of recycling the unprecedented amounts of surplus (that is, investable) dol-
lars, accumulated by OPEC nations from the sale of exported oil at sharply
increased prices, which cannot immediately be spent on goods and serv-
ices.47 The competition among Eurodollar banks for a share of the OPEC
surplus recycling business was fierce. The largest American commercial
banks were able to receive a preponderant proportion of these funds both
because of their competitive zeal and, presumably, because investors whose
'Harfield, International Money Management.- The Eurodollar, 89 BANKING L.J. 579 (1972).
This definition was amended de facto on December 3, 1981, when United States banks opened
the newly permitted "International Banking Facilities" to handle Euromarket business
onshore. The salient characteristic of "IBFs," however, is that because United States interest
limitations and reserve requirements do not apply to deposits booked in the IBFs, the deposits
may be held only by offshore persons or entities and the funds so raised may be relent only for
use abroad. The hope of the regulators in imposing these limitations on IBFs is that IBF
transactions will not affect the domestic economy's money supply. As a result of this new form
of participation in the Eurocurrency markets by United States banks, an updated definition of
"Eurodollar" might be considered to be one of a dollar that circulates offshore, i.e., outside the
domestic economy of the issuer of the currency. The focus is no longer on where the dollar
deposit is "payable."
"See B.J. COHEN, BANKS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 4-5 (1981).
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preference was to hold dollar assets preferred to take the liabilities of the
largest banks whose "natural" currency is the dollar. By September 1977,
over $19 billion had been invested by OPEC countries in foreign branches
of American banks and $9 billion more in head offices of American
banks.48
For American commercial banks large enough to attract these petrodol-
lars to their foreign branches, 49 such placement had an added dimension as
noteworthy as the funds themselves. That is, funds on deposit with the for-
eign offices of United States banks were generally less subject to regulation
than funds held on deposit with the banks' head offices or branches in the
United States. 50 To depositors, this was reflected in higher interest rates
than the bank could pay on a similar account held at its head office or
branches in the United States.5 ' For the banks, aside from the added com-
petitiveness that resulted from being free to bargain for available funds, this
flexibility most usefully took the form of release from Federal Reserve
Board requirements, specifically the need to maintain reserves against bal-
ances booked abroad, even if these deposits were, in effect, redeposited by a
United States bank's foreign branch in its head office in the United States.52
American commercial banks, among others, recycled some of these
petrodollar deposits into large-scale, long-term "sovereign loans," often to
developing countries, the Shah's government being a favored borrower.
These Eurodollar sovereign loans are variable interest rate loans provided
at some margin over the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), to which
commitment fees (and, where loans are syndicated, as they usually are,
management and participation fees) are added.53 These rates and fees are
primarily a function of the Eurodollar loan market, but also reflect banks'
48Basagni, Recent Developments in International Lending Patterns, in Cohen, supra note 47,
at Table 3.1, page 79. See also letter dated January 10, 1978 from Secretary of the Treasury
W. Michael Blumenthal to Rep. Henry S. Reuss, Chairman of the House Committee on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 124 CONG. REC. H1403-H1408 at H1407, Feb. 23, 1978 (here-
inafter cited as "Blumenthal letter"). The actual amount of OPEC investment in the United
States at this time may have been higher, since available figures do not reflect indirect invest-
ments made through nominee accounts. Id.4
'The exact terms under which these OPEC investments are deposited in banks outside the
United States are not generally disclosed by the banks, for competitive reasons. Aspects of
these terms became the subject of.litigation in Europe when Iran sought to obtain the release
of its deposits in European branches of United States banks, following the imposition of the
freeze.
5 See Harfield, supra note 46, at 582-585 and 589-590. But see note 52, infra.
"Indeed, the attractiveness of Euro-interest rates, not just the OPEC surplus and world
liquidity demands by themselves, explains the extraordinary volume of Eurocurrency financ-
ing by the late 1970s. See Cohen, supra note 47, at 69-70.
'
2Harfield, supra note 46, at 589-590. However, deposits are subject to reserve requirements
if the bank has guaranteed payment by the foreign branch and, at present, on "Eurocurrency
liabilities" as defined in Regulation D (funds raised abroad and returned to the United States
or lent to United States residents). Id. at 589-590n, and Lichtenstein, United States Legislation
and Regulations Applicable to Defposits and Loans Held by United States Branches or Subsidiar-
ies Outside the United States, in LEs EUROCREDITS (Blaise, Fouchard & Kahn eds.) at 409-419
(Librairies Techniques, Paris, 1981).
"See the Blumenthal letter, supra note 48, at H1407.
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assessment of the creditworthiness of individual borrowers.54 The least
creditworthy pay the highest rate and, so long as these loans are serviced in
a timely manner, they should be the most profitable to the banks.
By the end of 1977, American banks' exposure to default from loans to
foreign governments had become a matter of congressional concern,55 as
had the capacity of the banks to manage their liabilities. 56 Concern had
increased after 1975, when Pertamina, the state oil company of Indonesia,
an OPEC member, had difficulty servicing its foreign debt, and was hardly
lessened as the dollar came under severe selling pressure in international
money markets, allegedly in consequence of a large-scale sell-off of United
States securities by certain other OPEC countries.57
Thus, even before February 1979 United States monetary authorities had
had to consider how well the United States commercial banking system
could cope with sudden shocks in light of the relative instability of its
sources of funds, the increasing length of maturity of its loans and doubts
about the creditworthiness of some of its largest borrowers. In a reassuring
letter to Congressman Henry S. Reuss, Chairman of the House Committee,
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, dated January 10, 1978, Treasury
Secretary Blumenthal, like Assistant Secretary Bergsten earlier, expressed
confidence in the ability of the banking system to deal with these problems
on its own:
Maturity transformation is one of the principal functions of commercial banks,
whether operating domestically or abroad. The transformation by individual
banks of relatively shorter-term bank liabilities into longer-term assets becomes a
source of concern only where there are gross excesses and inadequate attention is
paid to risk...
We do not believe that maturity transformation represents a problem in the
aggreate since liabilities in the global banking system cannot simply or suddenly
be extinguished by the holders of the claims. As a practical matter, deposits with-
drawn from a bank or banks must either be redeposited directly in another
bank(s) or used to purchase goods, services or investments, with the proceeds of
these sales being placed in the banking system in the absence of monetary policies
designed to sterilize such funds.58
The confidence publicly expressed by United States monetary authorities
in the capacity of the banking system to recycle funds precipitously with-
drawn from particular banks did not diminish even after the political and
economic situation in Iran worsened the following year, and even though
Iranian governmental agencies were known to be major sources of deposits
in domestic and foreign branches of United States banks, as well as major
4Id.
"Id. at H1404.
"See the letter dated December 15, 1977 from Chairman Reuss of the House Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs to which the Blumenthal letter, supra note 48, was in
response. 124 CONG. REC. H1402-HI403 (Feb. 23, 1978).
"Speculation on this point was reported, but not confirmed, in the HousE STAFF REPORT at
52.
"Blumenthal letter, supra note 48, at H1407-HI408.
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borrowers from those foreign branches. Shortly after the Shah was forced
to leave Iran, both the Treasury Department and the New York Fed 59 com-
mented favorably, if cautiously, upon a report issued by the General
Accounting Office (GAO)60 that found that even a massive sale of U.S.
securities or withdrawal of deposits from American banks by OPEC mem-
bers very likely would have a minimal impact on the American financial
system. In an April 19, 1979 letter to the GAO, Mr. Bergsten had said that
such action would "create problems, but not of a catastrophic nature, ' ' 6 1
adding, however, that:
We recognize, of course, that a sudden, massive attempt, whether by OPEC
countries, by other foreigners, or by Americans, to convert into other currencies
dollar assets held in the U.S. or abroad, could adversely affect the dollar
exchange rate.6
2
In his letter to the GAO, dated April 13th, the President of the New York
Fed, Paul Volker, said:
We agree with the general thrust of the report that [OPEC financial] holdings
do not themselves present a significant potential for affecting adversely the U.S.
financial system or economy. Our financial institutions and markets have coped
well with the massive international flow of funds that have developed in recent
years in the wake of major increases in energy prices and other dislocations in the
world economy. The Federal Reserve and Treasury working together have
shown that they can deal effectively with major surges in financial flows, and we
see no grounds for undue concern about our ability to handle future challenges of
this sort.6 3
Although the government was to take a very different position, at least
publicly, seven months later in imposing the freeze, there is little reason to
doubt that at this time, and possibly even at the time the Treasury recom-
mended the imposition of a freeze to the President, United States monetary
authorities were convinced that the dollar, the banking system and the
United States economy could all withstand any "disruptions" revolutionary
Iran on its own could cause. Whatever doubts they entertained probably
did not lead to the conclusion that the United States government should
adopt "monetary policies designed to sterilize" Iranian funds, at any rate,
because these policies themselves could be expected to disrupt the dollar,
"See note 25, supra.
'The General Accounting Office was created by the Budget and Accounting Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1921) to assist Congress, its committees and its members in carrying out their legislative
and oversight responsibilities. It undertakes legal, accounting, auditing and claims settlement
functions with respect to federal government programs and operations as assigned by Con-
gress, and it makes recommendations designed to provide more efficient and effective govern-
mental operations. It is under the direction and control of the Comptroller General of the
United States. See generally UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1980-1981 (Office of the
Federal Register), at 55.
"Quoted in the HousE STAFF REPORT at 4.
62Id.
631d.
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the banking system and the United States economy far more seriously than
would any repudiation of debts or withdrawal of funds by Iran.
The reason is that a significant portion of foreign investment in the
United States is motivated, in large measure, by the expectation that such
investments will be free from the degree of risk of expropriation or govern-
ment-imposed blocking to which they are subject elsewhere in the world.64
The possibility that the United States might block the transfer of assets of
nationals of country X in consequence of political developments in country
X undercuts this expectation. In 1979, then, United States monetary
authorities understood clearly that a freeze of Iranian assets in this country
could precipitate a reevaluation by all foreign investors of the attractiveness
of investment in the United States. Moreover, because it was clear that the
freeze, to be effective, would have to extend to Iranian deposits at foreign
branches of United States banks, not just to Iranian accounts maintained
and assets present in the United States, a freeze might strike at the founda-
tions of the post-war banking and economic cooperation which had helped
sustain Western economies for several decades and had made possible the
relatively smooth recycling of petrodollars in the 1970s. The Eurodollar
market itself was thought (by many American investors, not just foreign
ones) to be immune from the vicissitudes of United States banking regula-
tion. While this assumption was never justified (in that United States bank
regulators asserted jurisdiction over the foreign branches of United States
banks but refrained from exercising it in the interest of protecting the
banks' competitive position in the Eurodollar market) 65 a dramatic illustra-
tion of just how unjustified it was could only have been expected to further
discourage investment in the dollar and dollar-denominated securities
issued by United States banks abroad.
In fact, the Iranian assets freeze and its application to Eurodollar deposits
did reverberate throughout the world's principal investment centers,
although the figures available so far are equivocable insofar as they neither
support nor disprove the supposition that other OPEC nations would
reverse their preference for the holding of dollar-denominated deposits with
United States banks in the face of a freeze on such deposits adopted as a
political maneuver in response to economic or political policies adopted
abroad (i.e., in Iran). In May 1981, a Chase Manhattan Bank study indi-
cated that OPEC deposits in American banks and their foreign branches
actually rose by $1.1 billion in 1980, pointing out, however, that this repre-
sented less than 3 percent of the total rise in OPEC deposits ($44-$45 bil-
lion) with banks in the industrialized countries, a far cry from 1979, when
United States banks received over 40 percent of the increase in OPEC assets
held with banks.66
"See Papernick, Risks of Privaie Foreign Invesimenis in U.S., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 6, 1979, at p.l.
6'See Harfield, supra note 46, passim.
'N.Y. Times, May 11, 1981, at D2. Of the $110 billion OPEC current account surplus in
1980, $44-45 billion went into bank deposits in industrialized countries; $33 billion into other
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What is clear, however, is that the imposition in peacetime of a freeze on
foreign-owned assets on the scale involved in the case of Iran could not
have been anticipated with undifferentiated glee by the banking commu-
nity, which would have been-and ultimately was-the principal instru-
ment of the freeze's enforcement. For while the Iranian assets control
program does not appear to have precipitated a massive run on the dollar,
this outcome could not have been safely predicted in 1979. A more reason-
able prediction at that time would have been that such a freeze would have
a severe impact on the capacity of American banks to compete for Eurodol-
lar funds and, indeed, the attractiveness of dollar-denominated assets.
Bearing in mind the banks' exposure from the sovereign lending they had
undertaken in the 1970s, the added prospect of ffight from Eurodollar
deposits could only have seemed alarming to officers of individual banks.
To be sure, the political and economic deterioration in Iran posed severe
problems for the banks, quite aside from those involved in dealing with new
central bank and government authorities who, as noted, were unfamiliar
with customary procedures, practices and law in the banking industry in
general and the Eurodollar market in particular. The banks' stake in the
Iranian situation was huge, by ordinary criteria. At the time of the freeze,
American banks estimated that they were carrying $2.6 billion in Iranian
government loans on their books.67 The rhetoric of the revolution in Iran
made the stability of Iranian petrodollar deposits with foreign branches of
United States banks uncertain. The Iranian situation, in short, had all the
earmarks of the sort of credit crunch that could eventuate from the radical
changes in commercial banking in the 1970s. The banks, in profitably
recycling petrodollars, had been forced to bear sovereign lending risks the
OPEC investors themselves had in large measure sought to avoid. Now, the
consequences of these risks had begun to loom imminent.
investments in the same countries; $5 billion was lent directly to oil-importing developing
nations; $5 billion went to international organizations; and some $15 billion was accounted for
by short-term credits for oil exports. d. It is generally believed that some foreign investors
concerned with the contingency for future interruptions with the enjoyment of foreign-owned
assets by the American government switched to dollar-denominated securities of a kind that
could be held outside the jurisdiction or interjurisdictional reach of American banking author-
ities and United States courts. The court-ordered attachments of securities and bank accounts
during and after the Iranian assets freeze may have been as great a deterrence to holding assets
with United States banks and other entities as was the freeze itself. Cf N.Y. Times, Dec. 26,
1979, at DI; and see pp. 177-186, infra. Cf Lissakers, Money and Manipulation, 44 FOREIGN
POLICY, 107, 121 (1981).
6See Ball, The Unseemly Squabble Over Iran'sAssets, FORTUNE, Jan. 28, 1980, at 60. Iran's
military purchase contracts with the United States government totalled about $12 billion.
Commercial contracts of United States firms in Iran were reported by the Commerce Depart-
ment to be worth $15 to $20 billion by the time the freeze was imposed, with $2 to $2.5 billion
payable to such firms in any one year. See NAT'L L.J., March 5, 1979, at 3, 29.
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The Role of the Banks
The banks that had participated in syndicated loans to Iran appear to
have protected themselves more effectively than had other banks that lent
money to (and most non-bank creditors of) Iran. However, the terms of the
loan agreements varied, apparently even with respect to whether syndicate
members were obliged to share funds they were in a position to "set ofi '
once a default occurred. 68 When the November 1979 crisis threw the status
of these loans into doubt, the exposure of syndicate members to loss from
default varied widely, some having far more liabilities to (i.e., deposits of)
Iran than the amount of their share of the loans to Iran, others quite the
reverse, some, apparently, in a middle position.69
It is worth emphasizing that even among syndicate members competition
for Iranian dollar deposits had been fierce following the fall of the Shah.
Their joint participation in syndication of loans to Iran did not diminish
this rivalry. This general competition among United States commercial
banks involved in the Eurodollar markets is important to bear in mind in
light of charges made later that in proceeding to negotiate privately with the
Iranian central bank authorities after the freeze had been imposed, the syn-
dicate banks, with the help of the Treasury, proceeded to feather their own
nests at some expense to non-syndicate members. 70
Moreover, it helps in understanding charges leveled almost immediately
after the freeze was imposed that Treasury officials had been persuaded to
recommend the freeze by certain of the largest banks, especially Chase
Manhattan Bank.71 The evidence against Chase (against in the sense that
the charges suggest that the freeze was in Chase's rather than in overall
United States interests) was necessarily circumstantial. It is generally
known that at least since the mid- 1970s Chase had been a principal in many
of the syndicated loans to Iran and that for so long as the Shah remained in
power the revenues from the proceeds of the sale of Iranian oil in the
United States were channeled principally through Chase. 72 Few people
doubted that the Shah himself had approved the choice of Chase for that
68Provisions in some syndicate agreements, but apparently not in all of them, required a
syndicate member receiving a windfall payment to share it with other members of the syndi-
cate-a cooperative device that helped the members of the syndicate as a group but that left
individual banks less protected than the amount of Iranian deposits it could get hold of might
suggest. See HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 59-60.
6 Bank of America, for example, had over four times as much in Iranian dollar deposits in
its overseas branches as did any other United States bank, and in relation to its huge amount
of deposits it had a small amount of loan exposure. Chemical Bank, on the other hand, had
seven times as much tied up in dollar loans to Iran as it held in Iranian overseas deposits.
HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 38.
"See House Staff Report at 60-61.
"See, for example, Legal Repercussions of the Freezing ofIranian Assets and Loans, INT'L
CURRENCY REV. 25 (March 1, 1980); Taylor, Megabankers, Carter Schemed to Create Iranian
Crisis, Freeze Funds, SPOTLIGHT, Feb. 9, 1981, at 16; Sherrill, Big Oil, Big Banks, Big Trouble,
PENTHOUSE MAGAZINE, June 1980, at 72; Davis, Hostages for the Chase Manhattan, id,
December 1980, at 174; and, generally, HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 51-60.
"See note 26, supra.
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coveted account. 73 Whether David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board of
Chase, was as intimate a personal as well as professional associate of the
Shah as has often been assumed in the press is open to honest doubt.74 But
that he and Chase were closely associated with the Shah in the minds of the
Iranians who overthrew the Shah is not. Nor is there any reason to doubt
that Mr. Rockefeller himself played a leading role in the campaign to per-
suade the Carter Administration to admit the Shah; Mr. Rockefeller has
readily acknowledged this role.75 Because of these links, and because in
revolutionary Iran it was taken for granted that Chase was the conduit used
by the Shah to secrete his personal wealth outside Iran, Mr. Rockefeller and
Chase became favorite targets of vituperative revolutionary rhetoric. More
than that, the shift of Iranian accounts from Chase became a revolutionary
tenet.7
6
By tying several of these threads together, critics made out more than a
coincidence in the timing of several events that immediately preceded the
imposition of the freeze. They noted, for example, that it was during those
months that Iran began shifting funds out of Chase77 and, coincidentally or
otherwise, that David Rockefeller, former Secretary of State Henry Kis-
singer, and New York attorney John J. McCloy, among others, had intensi-
fied their efforts to persuade President Carter to admit the Shah to the
United States. 78 The theory has been advanced in several quarters that
Chase engineered the freeze by convincing the government to permit the
Shah to come to the United States, knowing that that act would lead to
violence in Iran and make inevitable a freeze that would halt the outflow of
funds from Chase, at least temporarily. 79 This, it has been suggested,
would have given Chase time to protect itself against threats to its liquidity
allegedly posed by a withdrawal of Iranian funds and the possibility that
7"See HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 8.
'
41d. His late brother Nelson, former vice president and, before that, governor of New York,
had been a personal friend of the Shah for two decades. See Smith, Why Carter Admitted the
Shah, in America in Captivity.- Points of Decision in the Hostage Crisis, An Inquiry by the New
York Times, New York Times Magazine (Special Issue, 1981), at 40. The International Basic
Economy Corporation, a company created by the Rockefeller family, reportedly built the first
housing development in Iran m the mid-1950s at the foot of the property on which the Shah's
palace was eventually built. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at A19.
1d. at 37.
6HousE STAFF REPORT at 8. See also note 26, supra.
"HOUsE STAFF REPORT at 55.
"Dr. Kissinger has been a long-time adviser to the Rockefellers and, subsequent to serving
as Secretary of State, was an adviser to Chase in its international operations. Mr. McCloy,
who was in his mid-eighties by the time of the Iranian crisis, has served the United States
government in a variety of high level foreign policy positions since the 1940s. He had known
the Shah for years and his New York law firm, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, had
represented the Shah's family in many legal matters. The firm also represents Chase. See
Smith, Why Carter Admitted the Shah, supra note 74, at 44.
71HOusE STAFF REPORT at 56. Whatever Chase's and Mr. Rockefeller's roles may have
been in bringing the Shah to the United States and persuading United States monetary author-
ities to impose a freeze on Iranian assets, they are unlikely to have been motivated by as
simplistic an anticipation of cause and effect in United States and Iranian politics as these. Id.
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Iran might repudiate all or some of the outstanding loans.80
Another version of this charge suggests that the Shah himself had
threatened to withdraw his, his family's and his family foundation's depos-
its from Chase, if he were denied admission to the United States.8 ' Accord-
ing to one published account,8 2 the Treasury was even concerned that the
Shah might have accumulated an enormous secret stock of United States
government securities that he was prepared to sell, a prospect the Treasury
allegedly feared because it was believed that a massive sale of United States
securities by one or more OPEC countries during 1977 and 1978 had pro-
duced a serious run on the dollar. The Shah's cache, the theory runs, might
have been larger; the Treasury just did not know.8 3
The case against Chase or the Shah or both bringing about the events
which led to the imposition of a freeze seemed to be strengthened, again
circumstantially, by the way Chase handled Bank Markazi's request to
draw down just over $4 million from Iran's account with Chase's London
'°See Davis, Hostages for the Chase Manhattan, supra note 71, at 174, as quoted in the
HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 54-55. A similar suggestion, more cautiously worded, appeared in a
column by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, Washington Post, March 24, 1980, at C23.
Excerpts from these reports are quoted in the House Staff Report at 54-55 and 53-54, respec-
tively. The House Staff Report gave little credence to suggestions that Chase's liquidity was
endangered by Iran's withdrawal of deposits. It said:
While Iran at various times held fairly major deposits with Chase, the bank was hardly
dependent on the deposits for its solvency. The daily cash flow of Chase's worldwide opera-
tions dwarfed the Iranian deposits. While a total withdrawal of those deposits would have
hurt Chase, realistically it would not have been anywhere near a mortal blow driving Chase
into bankruptcy, as the quotes from the Jack Anderson column and from Penthouse suggest.
Indeed, one Chase official has described the effect on Chase of an Iranian withdrawal as a
"hiccup."
Id. at 55.
8 See Sherrill, Big Oil, Big Banks, Big Trouble, PENTHOUSE MAGAZINE, June 1980, at 72;
and Wright, Buried Treasure at Chase Manhattan, INQUIRY, April 7, 1980, at 15. Excerpts
from these reports are quoted in the House Staff Report at 54 and 52-53, respectively.
'
2Wright, Buried Treasure .... supra note 81.
"
3 The House Staff Report accorded little credence to this speculation, as well. It said:
Based on discussions with many of the principals involved in admitting the Shah, there is
no indication that the Shah's alleged holdings of Treasury securities played in the negotia-
tions [leading to the admission of the Shah to the United States).
The allegation itself assumes that Treasury was ignorant of the Shah's actual holdings of
Treasury securities. If the Shah did not hold those securities in his own name or if a broker
of some sort was used to purchase them, in fact Treasury would not know exactly how much
the Shah may have held. Officials at the Treasury who are most familiar with the transac-
tions in Treasury securities say they were never asked for information about the Shah's
personal or family holdings of those securities by any officials involved in negotiations with
the Shah. Even assuming the Shah threatened to withdraw his purported holdings of Treas-
ury securities if he were not admitted to the United States, it is inconceivable that senior
United States officials hearing such a threat would not have checked with their United States
Government sources to get information about the Shah's holdings. No one involved in dis-
cussions concerning the Shah recalls withdrawal of the Shah's assets being part of the mat-
ters discussed. Therefore the issue of how much information the United States would have
on the Shah's wealth and the impact of a withdrawal of his assets never played a role in the
Shah's admission.
HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 53.
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branch and to use the funds to pay the next installment on a $500 million
"jumbo" loan for which Chase was the agent for a syndicate made up of
seven American and four non-American banks. The cabled instructions
were sent and received on November 5, ten days before the installment due
date (and, as it happens, one day after the seizure of the embassy). On
November 14, Iran's Foreign Minister, Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, himself
involved in a struggle for power in Iran with religious leaders, suggested at
a news conference that Iran might--or was going to that day (this discrep-
ancy in reports of the event has never been resolved) 84-withdraw its funds
from United States banks and their overseas branches and transfer them to
friendlier countries.8 5 News of the announcement reached Washington
before dawn on November 14 and prompted Treasury Secretary G. Wil-
liam Miller to awaken the President and recommend that he sign an execu-
tive order freezing Iran's assets.8 6 The freeze barred transfers of property
and interests in property of the Iranian government, its instrumentalities
and controlled entities, and Bank Markazi "which are in or come within the
possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States." Chase cabled Bank Markazi that by virtue of the freeze order its
(Bank Markazi's) payment instructions could not be carried out. Chase
also demanded immediate payment of the installment and when Iran did
not pay (from funds not subject to the transfer freeze), the Chase-led syndi-
cate voted to declare the loan in default.
Some nonbanking, and nonlawyering critics charged that Chase could
have complied with Bank Markazi's request before the 15th;8 7 in fact, it
appears that the terms of Iran's payment order prohibited payment before
that date. 88 Some published accounts said Chase simply informed the other
syndicate members that Iran was in default;8 9 in fact, Chase appears to
have complied with syndicate agreement provisions requiring a polling of
loan syndicate members to determine their preference as to a declaration of
the existence of a default. 90 Reports appeared that the vote was seven to
four in favor of declaring a state of default, with the four non-American
"*Compare Davis, supra note 71, with Smith, Hostages First, supra note 5, at 82.
5See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at i; Ball, The Unseemly Squabble Over Iran'sAssets, supra
note 67, at 61; and the sources cited in note 84, supra.
"'See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at 1; Escalating the Iranian Drama, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov.
26, 1979, at 31; and Smith, Hostages'First, supra note 5, at 82. According to press accounts, a
Treasury Department watch officer read the reports of Mr. Bani-Sadr's threat between 4:00
A.M. and 5:00 A.M. and informed Secretary Miller. After determining that no withdrawals had
been made and after asking for support from central banks in Europe and Japan, Secretary
Miller awakened the President, recommending that he sign the order which, as already noted,
had been prepared well in advance. The President is reported to have signed the order at 8:00
A.M. Washington time. See statement of Robert Carswell before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Feb. 19, 1981, at 3.
'
7 E.g, Davis, supra note 71, as quoted in HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 54-55.
"HouSE STAFF REPORT at 55.
"Eg., Davis, supra note 71, as quoted in HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 54.
'°See Ball, supra note 67, at 61.
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banks voting against;9 1 later reports indicated the four negative votes would
have been affirmative had the foreign banks been aware of the legal basis
for the United States government's assertion that the freeze legally barred
transfer of Iranian deposits in accounts in foreign branches of United States
banks.92
The loan syndicate's determination that Iran's failure to pay the install-
ment due November 15 constituted an act of default triggered acceleration
clauses in the loan agreement that made the entire amount of the loan due
and payable, 93 and led the banks to debit Iran's frozen accounts at their
overseas branches for the full amount owing to them-at least to the extent
permitted under the agreement and to the extent individual loan syndicate
members had such liabilities (deposits) on hand to offset. These actions, in
turn, implicated creditor protection clauses in other loan agreements.
Almost immediately, a rush was on among Iran's creditors, including its
nonbank creditors, to attach whatever Iranian government assets were or
might become available for attachment in the United States and Europe.94
Chase's prominence in this episode added to speculation that it, and in
particular Mr. Rockefeller, triggered the Iranian hostage crisis to protect the
bank's own financial interests. Mr. Bani-Sadr contributed more fuel to the
fire at his press conference on November 14 when he said that the with-
drawal of Iranian funds from United States banks he was then threatening
was justified on the grounds that the banking interests led by Chase and
Mr. Rockefeller were responsible for the admission of the Shah to the
United States. 95 The inference was drawn that the admission of the Shah to
the United States and the imposition of a freeze on Iranian assets were all
part of an elaborate financial plot designed to help the banks, especially
Chase, out of the difficulties they created for themselves in overextending
credit to Third World countries.
In July 1981, however, the bipartisan report by the staff of the House of
Representatives' Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (pub-
lished as a Committee Print even without official adoption by the Commit-
tee) concluded that scenarios of the kind herein and therein described "are
filled with conclusions that are more fanciful than real."' 96 It offered several
reasons to doubt the Chase-did-it theories. First, Chase could not safely
have predicted that admission of the Shah to the United States would lead
to a taking of hostages in Iran, a United States government freeze on Ira-
nian assets and ultimate benefits for Chase's financial interests. Further
association with the Shah might well have presented itself as an undesirable
policy, if the bank's future relations with Iran and other third world nations
"Id.
9
2See Why Did Chase Move So Fast?, EUROMONEY, January 1980 (cover story).
"
3 See Legal Repercussions . ., supra note 71, at 28.
"See Gordon, supra note 20, Passion.
9 N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at A19.
"HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 56.
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were considered objectively. Moreover, as some Chase critics themselves
have pointed out, if Chase needed an event like the freeze to persuade fel-
low loan syndicate members to declare the $500 million loan (or all Iran's
syndicated loans with cross-default clauses) in default,97 there were surely
measures available to it involving less risk of a severe and wholly unpre-
dictable reaction from other OPEC investors than a freeze entailed.
Speculation that the banks, especially Chase Manhattan, had persuaded
the government that a freeze was in the best interests of the United States
was hardly dampened by the reasons advanced publicly-and apparently
privately-by the government for imposing the freeze as it did and when it
did. In his message to Congress explaining the circumstances dictating his
need to invoke the extraordinary powers authorized by IEEPA, President
Carter cited "recent events in Iran and the recent actions of the government
of Iran," adding that "these events and actions put at a grave risk the per-
sonal safety of United States citizens and the lawful claims of United States
citizens and entities against the government of Iran.' '98 Imposition of the
freeze, he said, was necessary to "enable the United States to assure that
these [blocked] resources will be available to satisfy lawful claims of citizens
and entities of the United States against the government of Iran." 99 Secre-
tary Miller reportedly telephoned the Saudi finance minister immediately to
assure him the freeze was an act of financial self-defense, designed to pro-
tect the dollar, and not a matter of political retaliation. 10 The details of his
awakening President Carter upon receiving news of Mr. Bani-Sadr's threat
were featured conspicuously in press accounts of how the freeze came to be
invoked,' 0 ' thereby adding to the impression that the threat represented a
dramatic and dangerous new element in the Iranian situation. The same
theme was sounded by Secretary Miller in his subsequent mission to
Mideast and European capitals to explain the freeze to foreign officials who
were alarmed by the implications of the freeze for their own dollar invest-
ments and the well-being of the petrodollar recycling system. 10 2
The July 1981 House Banking Committee staff report called attention to
the pronounced discrepancy between these administration assertations and
previous assurances from government monetary authorities that the bank-
ing system was capable of handling even sudden and massive withdrawals
by foreign depositors of the type Mr. Bani-Sadr was threatening to carry
out. "While there is no doubt that Bani-Sadr made such a statement," the
'The House Staff Report indicated, without being too specific about dates, that some time
during the first half of 1979, the United States banks polled by Chase refused to consider
calling any of the Iranian loans. Id. at 3.
9815 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2118 (Nov. 14, 1979).
991d.
"'°Smith, Hostages First, supra note 5, at 82.
'°'See, for example, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at 1; Escalating the Iranian Drama, BusI-
NESS WEEK, Nov. 26, 1979, at 31; and Ball, Unseemly SFquabble Over Iran's Assets, supra note
67, at 61.
"'See N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1979, at DI; Legal Repercussions. supra note 71, at 25; and
HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 13-14.
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report concluded, "there is very serious doubt that if the Bani-Sadr state-
ment were carried out to the fullest degree. . . the economy of the United
States would have been subject to an unusual and extraordinary threat." 10 3
It then observed:
Longstanding and apparently universally accepted Department of the Treasury
policy. . . directly contradicted the premise that withdrawal of Iranian deposits
from U.S. financial institutions would jeopardize our United States financial sys-
tem or pose an unusual or extraordinary threat to the economy of the United
States. Similarly, Iranian threats to repudiate its United States obligations, which
had been threatened by revolutionary figures on various occasions without result
for as long as a year before the hostage crisis, was an unlikely event, and if con-
summated, not an unusual and extraordinary threat to the economy of the United
States... Discussions with the vast majority of the individuals involved in pre-
paring the recommendations to President Carter to trigger IEEPA indicate that
while outflows of Iranian dollars and Iranian debt repudiation were considered,
the freeze was basically a political response to the barbaric acts of the Iranians. 104
The staff report noted that statements by the government, particularly
those by Secretary Miller, "attempt to lead one to conclude that a primary
justification for the freeze was the threat to the United States economy
[posed] by Iranian repudiation of United States debt and the withdrawal of
Iranian funds from United States financial institutions." 10 5 It then asked
and answered the critical question:
If, in fact, the freeze was truly a political response to the severity of the Iranian
actions, which constituted an unusual or extraordinary threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States, 106 then, why was there so much
public emphasis put on the economic ramifications of Iran's actions? It is our
opinion that the Carter Administration was in the process of implementing the
freeze before Bani-Sadr made his threat to withdraw Iranian funds from United
States banks. The Bani-Sadr threat added an economic justification-however
weak its premise-to the actual political justification which prompted the freeze.
The added economic justification became important because of the reaction to
the freeze by others, primarily OPEC countries.107
The report recalled that, at the time, such countries (Saudi Arabia in partic-
ular) were under internal religious pressures that made their endorsement
of a United States freeze based on political grounds practically impossible.
1°1HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 13.
0I41d.
o1'0 d.
"°The report's repeated references to "an unusual or extraordinary threat" is understood to
relate back to the conditions which trigger the applicability of IEEPA.
101HOUSE STAFF REPORT at 13. A recently published article by a former State Department
analyst offers virtually the opposite conclusion. Writing in Foreign Policy, Karin Lissakers
says that the freeze was, in fact, imposed because the government feared that Iran would use
its dollar deposits in American banks as an economic weapon. Quoting then Under-Secretary
of the Treasury Anthony Solomon as saying, "Our concern that morning [ie., November 141
was the dollar, not the banks," Ms. Lissakers adds: "Iran, they thought, would seek to disrupt
foreign exchange markets, even at the risk of reducing the value of its foreign [dollar] hold-
ings." Lissakers, supra note 66, at 112. It seems impossible to reconcile the conclusions
reached by the House staff with Ms. Lissakers' assertions.
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Emphasis on the alleged economic reasons for the freeze enabled them to
support (or at least tolerate) the freeze by stressing it as an effort to preserve
the dollar and the United States economy, an economy in which such
OPEC countries as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had made major
investments. 10 8
That the freeze was primarily a political response may explain its timing,
but it does not explain exactly what benefits the government hoped to
obtain from it. Soundings taken by the New York Fed the weekend before
the Wednesday (November 14) on which the freeze was announced indi-
cated that the major New York banks were generally against the imposition
of a freeze,' 09 and that those that were for it were those whose Iranian
deposits were small compared to their exposure to Iranian loans nonpay-
ment."10 The House Staff Report summarized these attitudes this way:
The reason for these differing positions was that Iran's fleeing deposits would
generally return to the United States banking system after being funneled
through a foreign bank or the Eurodollar market or both. This "recycling" con-
cept, which was widely accepted by those familiar with the Eurodollar market,
meant that a bank could generally get back what it lost in withdrawn deposits if it
were willing to pay a premium on the Eurodollar market. On the other hand, a
repudiated loan, and particularly one without any possibility of setoff against an
Iranian deposit, could not be recouped in a similar fashion. Accordingly, those
institutions with large loan portfolios and few deposits were more interested in
the potential value of a freeze, and in preserving the status quo, than those rela-
tively secure institutions with deposits far in excess of their Iranian loans. Il
The Federal Reserve was apparently against the freeze, in part because
any action which created the appearance of nervousness or instability in the
American financial marketplace made it difficult for the Federal Reserve to
deal confidently with its foreign central bank counterparts, but also because
it anticipated that foreign banks might attempt to use the appearance of
instability in the United States financial system for their own competitive
advantage. "12
"'HousE STAFF REPORT at 14.
'The Federal Reserve collects and reports to the Treasury critical information on foreign
deposits in United States banks and loan exposure of United States banks to foreign countries.
The information is collected monthly--detailed information quarterly-and can easily become
outdated. After the seizure of the embassy on November 4, united States government policy-
makers wanted more accurate information on the aggregate Iranian deposit and loan exposure
for United States banks in order to judge the impact of potential sanctions against Iran. On
November 10, a Saturday, in response to a request for emergency assistance from Treasury
Secretary Miller, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volker directed New York Fed Vice
President Scott Pardee to gather up-to-date information from United States bankers on Ira-
nian deposits and loans. Mr. Pardee telephoned each of the major New York banks that held
accounts with Iran to determine the latest status of these loans and deposits. By Monday,
November 12, which was a legal holiday, he had gathered enough information to give Treas-
ury officials some statistics. "While [his] contacts with the banks were meant to be informa-
tional and statistical, [Mr. Pardee] was also instructed to take note of any comments that
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Thus, the administration was aware that from the point of view of the
banking community a freeze of the approximately $6.8 billion of Iranian
assets on deposit at United States and foreign branches of United States
banks1 3 was as likely as not to be counterproductive. What advice the
government was getting from United States claimants outside the banking
system has not yet been made public. Presumably, legal counsel for these
claimants were aware that, while a freeze would enable some of Iran's bank
creditors in the United States to offset Iranian deposits, their own clients
would probably have no such mechanism available to them, at least as to
the assets of Iranian government entities, i.e., as the Treasury Department
had foreseen nine months earlier. 114 The freeze order would effectively
keep Iranian government assets from being removed from the United States
for a while, but that in itself would enhance the likelihood of the nonbank-
ing claimants being paid only, or most likely, if the government could use
its powers under IEEPA to authorize United States courts to order attach-
ments of Iranian government property-and even that would help only to
the extent such property was available after the banks had set off Iranian
government deposits in amounts at least equal to the aggregate amount of
the banks' own claims,
Of course, it is entirely possible that most nonbanking claimants had not
yet given serious thought to how a freeze would affect their interests, short-
term or long-term, and that, had they tried to do so, they would not have
had available to them sufficient data about the amount of Iranian deposits
in the United States that might be subject to the freeze, the legal position of
the banks respecting offsets of Iranian deposits and the priority to be given
to such offsets as against rights of other claimants, and even whether the
government freeze order would effectively prohibit any attachments of Ira-
nian government property during the period it was in effect. Thus, while
they might well have realized that without a freeze they would probably
have to chase Iranian assets the world over to satisfy their claims, they
could not have been certain that even with a freeze in place their task would
be any easier.
But in the political climate that prevailed in Washington during the ten
days following the seizure of the embassy and the taking of the hostages,
these considerations may have received comparatively short shrift. What
was at stake was America's reputation-and President Carter's. A consen-
sus was reached quickly to proceed with a freeze, not so much because it
would immediately cause Iran to release the hostages as because the gov-
ernment had to do something to show the Iranians, the American public
and the world at large that it could, and would, take decisive action. The
'Id. at 29.
"'See page 165, supra.
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idea of a freeze probably struck no one in the government as a particularly
appealing idea. But it may well have seemed to be the best option available
at the time among those that presented a reasonable likelihood of further-
ing diplomatic efforts to obtain the hostages' release.
